CyberSecurity news
FlagThis - #infrastructure
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Cynthia B@Metacurity
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The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned Funnull Technology Inc., a Philippines-based company, for providing infrastructure that facilitated "pig butchering" scams, a type of cryptocurrency investment fraud that has cost Americans over $200 million. The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action on May 29, 2025, targeting Funnull and its administrator, Liu Lizhi. The FBI has also issued an advisory warning against Funnull, highlighting its role as a major distributor of online scams. Funnull is accused of enabling cybercriminals by purchasing IP addresses in bulk from major cloud service providers and then selling them to operators of fraudulent investment platforms.
The sanctions follow an FBI investigation that linked Funnull to the majority of virtual currency investment scam websites reported to them. The agency stated that Funnull directly facilitated pig butchering and other schemes that resulted in more than $200 million in financial losses for U.S. victims, with average individual losses exceeding $150,000. These scams typically involve perpetrators posing as romantic partners or friends online to gain victims’ trust, then convincing them to invest in virtual currency on platforms that ultimately prove to be fraudulent. Scammers often demand additional "taxes" on purported crypto earnings before allowing victims to withdraw their funds, which never happens. Security firm Silent Push had previously identified Funnull as a criminal content delivery network (CDN) routing traffic through U.S.-based cloud providers before redirecting users to malicious websites. Their October 2024 research exposed a sprawling cluster of domains, dubbed "Triad Nexus," routed through Funnull's CDNs, revealing how cybercriminals leverage credible cloud providers for malicious activities through what they termed "infrastructure laundering." The FBI observed patterns of IP address activity on Funnull infrastructure between October 2023 and April 2025, including the simultaneous migration of hundreds of domains to other IP addresses, further complicating efforts to track and combat the scams. Recommended read:
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info@thehackernews.com (The@The Hacker News
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A long-term cyber intrusion aimed at critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the Middle East has been attributed to an Iranian state-sponsored threat group. The attack, which persisted from May 2023 to February 2025, entailed extensive espionage operations and suspected network prepositioning, a tactic used to maintain persistent access for future strategic advantage. The network security company noted that the attack exhibits tradecraft overlaps with Lemon Sandstorm (formerly Rubidium), also tracked as Parisite, Pioneer Kitten, and UNC757, an Iranian nation-state threat actor active since at least 2017.
The attackers gained initial access by exploiting stolen login credentials to access the victim's SSL VPN system, deploying web shells on public-facing servers, and deploying three backdoors: Havoc, HanifNet, and HXLibrary, for long-term access. They further consolidated their foothold by planting more web shells and an additional backdoor called NeoExpressRAT, using tools like plink and Ngrok to burrow deeper into the network, performing targeted exfiltration of the victim's emails, and conducting lateral movement to the virtualization infrastructure. In response to the victim's initial containment and remediation steps, the attackers deployed more web shells and two more backdoors, MeshCentral Agent and SystemBC. Even after the victim successfully removed the adversary's access, attempts to infiltrate the network continued by exploiting known Biotime vulnerabilities and spear-phishing attacks aimed at employees to harvest Microsoft 365 credentials. Researchers identified an evolving arsenal of tools deployed throughout the intrusion, including both publicly available and custom-developed malware. The custom tools, such as NeoExpressRAT, a Golang-based backdoor with hardcoded command and control communication capabilities, allowed the threat actors to maintain persistent access while evading traditional detection methods. Recommended read:
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@lemonde.fr
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A significant power outage struck Spain and Portugal on April 28, 2025, at 10:34 UTC, causing widespread disruptions to daily life. The outage affected transport, communication, and infrastructure across the Iberian Peninsula, and briefly extended into southwest France. Disruptions were also reported in Morocco, affecting some internet providers and airport check-in systems. Millions were left in the dark as the power grid failures brought transportation to a standstill and forced businesses and schools to close.
The cause of the massive power failure is currently under investigation, with officials exploring possible technical faults. Initial investigations by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) suggest a technical or cable issue, ruling out a cyberattack at this stage. However, ENISA is closely monitoring the situation and maintaining contact with national and EU authorities. The Spanish grid operator, Red Electrica, initially attributed the outage to "grid oscillation," a phenomenon caused by the system's inability to suppress normal oscillations that occur when sources and load change. However, the operator later denied these claims. Internet connectivity was also impacted in both Spain and Portugal. In Portugal, Internet traffic immediately dropped by half, plummeting to approximately 90% below the previous week within five hours. Request traffic to Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 DNS resolver also decreased significantly. The loss of Internet traffic from local providers like NOS, Vodafone, MEO, and NOWO was notably swift. Mobile traffic initially spiked as subscribers sought information, but even that eventually fell to half the volume seen the prior week. Electricity is being "progressively" restored in some regions. Recommended read:
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@www.wsj.com
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China has reportedly acknowledged its role in cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure, specifically those attributed to the Volt Typhoon campaign. This admission occurred during a secret meeting with U.S. officials in December, according to SecurityWeek. U.S. officials noted that Volt Typhoon's actions, which involved infiltrating various industries' systems through zero-day exploits and other advanced tactics, were an attempt to deter U.S. support for Taiwan. Furthermore, cyberespionage by the Chinese state-backed Salt Typhoon group against U.S. telecommunications firms was also discussed, revealing the compromise of U.S. officials' communications.
These attacks are part of a broader pattern of Chinese state-backed hackers increasing their activity against infrastructure in the U.S., Europe, and the Asia-Pacific region. Recent intelligence indicates groups like Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon have infiltrated power grids, telecommunications networks, and transportation systems. Their apparent goal is to preposition for potential wartime disruption or coercive retaliation during periods of geopolitical tension. This approach involves installing dormant "logic bombs" designed to be triggered during a conflict or crisis, maintaining persistent access while minimizing detection risk. The intensified cyber activities are viewed as a component of China's cyber-enabled irregular warfare strategy. Recent incidents include a power grid failure in Taiwan linked to a Volt Typhoon logic bomb, along with similar occurrences reported in European infrastructure. The attacks' sophistication lies in their "Living Off the Land" techniques, blending state-sponsored hacking with proxy groups and disinformation to achieve strategic objectives without triggering conventional military responses. Such actions, as analyzed by IT security professional Simone Kraus, raise concerns due to their potential for devastating real-world consequences if critical infrastructure is compromised. Recommended read:
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