CVE-2026-48168
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 4.6.40, the bundled Claude GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to command injection because it embeds an attacker-controlled pull request branch name into a Bash run: block without quoting or validation. Additionally, the workflow allows any @claude comment to trigger the job regardless of whether the commenter is a trusted collaborator. An outside contributor can open a pull request from a fork whose branch name contains shell metacharacters and comment @claude, causing Bash to execute arbitrary shell code in the GitHub Actions runner. Because these commands run in a job holding a GitHub App token with write permissions, OIDC access, and gh/git access, the injection can be chained through $GITHUB_PATH to compromise later privileged steps, enabling repository writes, pull request and issue manipulation, or OIDC-token abuse. This issue has been fixed in version 4.6.40.
Threat Intelligence Signals
Identity & Timeline
| Status | - |
| Assigning Authority | - |
| CVSS Version / Source | - |
| Reserved | - |
| Published | - |
| Patch Date (date_public) | - |
| Exploit DB Date | - |
| First GitHub PoC Date | - |
| Last Updated | - |
| Time to Patch (Days to fix) | - |
| Exploit Release Gap | - |
| PoC Release Gap | - |
| Exploit DB References | None identified |
Affected Products & Versions
| Vendor | Product | Affected Versions |
|---|---|---|
| No affected products specified. | ||
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