A sophisticated supply chain campaign, attributed to the suspected threat actor TeamPCP, has simultaneously targeted the Mastra AI framework via npm, GitHub Actions CI/CD workflows, and the Arch Linux User Repository (AUR). The attack utilized dormant contributor account takeovers to poison the @mastra npm scope using the easy-day-js dependency and hijacked GitHub Action version tags to exfiltrate CI/CD credentials. Additionally, over 1,500 AUR packages were compromised with eBPF-based rootkit malware. This coordinated infrastructure, linked by the "Mini Shai-Hulud" worm, facilitates widespread code execution, credential theft, and persistent rootkit deployment across development, DevOps, and end-user Linux environments.

• Incident Overview and Scope

  • Targeted Ecosystems: Simultaneous strikes against the npm registry (@mastra scope), GitHub Actions (DevOps pipelines), and the Arch Linux User Repository (AUR).
  • Scale of Impact: Compromise of 144 Mastra AI packages, redirection of widely-used GitHub Actions, and infection of approximately 1,500 AUR packages.
  • Coordinated Infrastructure: The campaign is unified by the "Mini Shai-Hulud" worm, linking disparate attack vectors into a single, multi-stage operation.

• Attack Vector Mechanics

  • npm Dependency Poisoning: Attackers utilized dormant contributor account takeovers to inject malicious code into the @mastra scope, specifically leveraging the easy-day-js dependency for resolution hijacking.
  • CI/CD Tag Hijacking: Exploited actions-cool workflows by redirecting version tags, allowing the interception and exfiltration of sensitive GitHub Actions secrets.
  • Linux Kernel Exploitation: Deployed eBPF-based rootkit-like malware within the AUR to achieve stealthy, high-privilege persistence on Linux-based user environments.

• Malware and Payload Profile

  • Shai-Hulud/Mini Shai-Hulud: A sophisticated worm/infrastructure used to bridge the gap between npm dependency poisoning and CI/CD hijacking.
  • Payload Functionality: Payloads include cross-platform cryptocurrency stealers and deep-system rootkits designed for long-term environmental persistence.
  • Evasion Techniques: Utilization of eBPF allows for kernel-level stealth, making detection via traditional user-space security tooling difficult.

• Threat Actor Profile and Systemic Risk

  • Attribution: The complexity and coordination of the campaign strongly suggest the involvement of the TeamPCP threat group.
  • Lifecycle Compromise: The attack demonstrates an ability to compromise the entire software development lifecycle (SDLC), from AI framework development to production deployment.
  • Strategic Impact: The targeting of AI ecosystems (Mastra) and DevOps tooling (GitHub Actions) indicates a high-intent focus on modern enterprise infrastructure.

• Defensive Recommendations

  • Supply Chain Integrity: Implement strict dependency pinning and integrity verification (e.g., SHA-256 hashes) rather than relying on floating version tags or semantic versioning.
  • CI/CD Hardening: Use immutable commit SHAs for all GitHub Actions to prevent version tag hijacking and secret exfiltration.
  • Linux Security Monitoring: Deploy eBPF-aware security monitoring to detect unauthorized kernel-level programming and anomalous system calls.