Encrypted Mempools Amplify Funding Attacks via Reaction Gap

Arxiv pdf 2026-07-01T00:00:00
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Abstract

Encrypted mempools are designed to hide transaction contents until execution order is fixed, preventing many victim dependent forms of maximal extractable value. This paper studies a different class of attack in the form of _self-authored state manipulation_ , in which the attacker knows its own transaction and owns a downstream claim on the state that transaction changes. Perpetual futures funding is a canonical example. The funding signal determines a transfer rate, while receiving side open interest is the transfer base. In a commit then reveal mempool, an adaptive corrective transaction cannot enter the already committed batch. Privacy can therefore create an economic reaction gap even when cryptographic decryption overhead is negligible. We microfound correction through executable arbitrage opportunities. Correctors choose order size against local price impact and inventory cost, while the protocol information schedule determines which opportunities are actionable. The ordering barrier removes ordinary adaptive searchers from the closed stage. It therefore yields a closed stage correction rate _c_ below the adaptive correction rate _p_ whenever positive adaptive capacity becomes available after reveal. The distortion entering a funding window is multiplied by an explicit response factor _g_ ( __ ; _c, p, W_ ), where __ is the first adaptive reaction gap. We show that _g_ is strictly increasing in __ under the derived rate ordering. For an attacker with endowed receiving notional, the exact expected value of manipulation is quadratic in _mg_ , where _m_ is the fraction of targeting ability retained under privacy. Encryption is harmful precisely when the loss of attacker information is smaller than the increase in distortion persistence. We then add hidden tax base entry. Transaction privacy can also reduce capitalization of predictable funding into entry prices, producing a second amplification channel. The resulting local security index separates attacker blindness, correction shielding, and capitalization shielding.

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