Abstract

Adaptive network intrusion detection systems retrain classifiers after drift alarms, but an alarm detects change; it does not establish that a challenger should replace the deployed incumbent. Promotion is security-relevant because it changes the model responsible for subsequent attack detection, and evaluating it has a methodological problem: promotion conclusions may depend on how the challenger was constructed and on how much evidence supports it. We test that dependence on CICIDS2017, UNSW-NB15 and ToN-IoT with self-contained challenger pipelines, nested candidate-size controls, a common-harness comparison of nine update policies, and a final sensitivity confining every exact feature vector to one evaluation, training or probe role. Incumbent-owned frozen preprocessing amplified apparent promotion harm; with self-contained challenger pipelines the mean full-drift harm did not persist. Raising nominal candidate evidence from 512 to 2,000 samples per class improved promotion under pool-constructed progressive drift by +0 ._ 53, +1 _._ 67 and +0 _._ 38 balanced-accuracy points: positive and statistically resolved in all three benchmarks, but materially benchmark-dependent rather than homogeneous, and driven mainly by fewer false positives. Policy conclusions were partially robust: policy ordering changed with candidate comparability, no policy globally dominated, and earlier compatibility statements for a label-free estimator and a calibrated ensemble narrowed. Validation helped evidencedisadvantaged challengers but added no average benefit at parity. Thirteen replays on real, time-ordered traffic showed no net harm from always deploying. Challenger construction and evidence should be controlled, reported and interpreted explicitly when promotion is evaluated.