FlagThis

Abstract

Post-hoc unauthorized-training data detection for large language models (LLMs) typically assumes a query-with-originals regime: rights holders query a target LLM with raw proprietary data and assess whether the model assigns them stronger memorization-based detection signals, e.g., higher confidence or lower loss, than held-out non-training reference texts. We show that this regime becomes brittle under data laundering, where the target LLM is trained on semanticspreserving but stylistically or structurally transformed surrogates of proprietary data to obfuscate provenance. Since training-time exposure occurs in the laundered form, memorization signals may no longer appear on the originals, collapsing the candidate-reference signal separation that standard detectors rely on. We counter this threat by studying laundering-aware detection with raw proprietary data, a held-out reference corpus, and query access to the target LLM, while the laundering transformation is undisclosed. Since exact recovery of the laundered corpus is infeasible, we infer a detection-useful synthesis process via an auxiliary LLM that maps originals into training-like queries. To make this search tractable, we introduce Synthesis Data Reversion (SDR), which constrains the unbounded space of natural-language transformations through a goal-details abstraction: a high-level transformation goal, e.g., "lyrical rewriting", and fine-grained details, e.g., "with vivid imagery". SDR identifies the most likely goal and iteratively refines details so synthesized queries elicit stronger target-model detection signals. Evaluated on the MIMIR benchmark against diverse laundering practices and target LLM families (Pythia, Llama2, and Falcon), SDR consistently restores detection signals, offering a practical auditing layer against data laundering.