FlagThis

Abstract

Time-triggered communication protocols rely on trusted components known as guardians to enforce adherence to predetermined network schedules. Network-agnostic guardians offer an efficient and scalable distributed solution with reduced implementation cost and complexity compared to network-aware alternatives. However, this efficiency is based on the guardians dependence on the controlled node for clock synchronization, which introduces a vulnerability: a malicious node can exploit this dependency to launch timing attacks against its guardian and eventually interfere with messages from other nodes on the network. In this paper, we establish a theoretical lower bound on the attainable clock synchronization precision between a node and its network-agnostic guardian. Building on this result, we introduce a timing attack that leverages the unavoidably imperfect clock synchrony to cause controlled and undetected de-synchronization of the guardian. The attack enables a malicious node to cause collisions with targeted critical network messages. We evaluate the effectiveness of the attack using a FlexRay field bus network model implemented in the OMNeT++ simulation framework. Our results show that the attack is able to remain undetected with 100% success and disrupts the transmission of the critical messages of the target node by causing collisions with them with 100% success.