Linux Kernel CVE Triggerability Inference

Arxiv pdf 2026-08-01T00:00:00
arXiv Paper — PDF not available. Only the Executive Summary is available here. To read or download the full paper, visit the arXiv abstract page.

Abstract

Vendors assessing Linux kernel CVEs need to know whether a bug is triggerable under production-tailored configurations, not merely whether a version is affected, yet upstream reproducers and vulnerability databases rarely provide configuration-level context. We study minimal trigger-configuration inference: given a CVE entry and a target kernel version (optionally a baseline .config), we synthesize a Kconfig-satisfiable option set that remains effective after make olddefconfig and, when a reproducer is available, still triggers under a specified evaluation protocol; we then prune it to a 1-minimal (subset-minimal) boundary for evaluation. Our framework FCC links vulnerability cues to build-system symbols, completes implicit prerequisites under olddefconfig feedback to avoid silent rollback, and performs runtime-validated minimization guided by dependency topology. We evaluate on KernJC and KernelCTF, totaling 88 CVEs across multiple kernel versions. On the 88-CVE set, FCC improves the post-make olddefconfig configuration success rate from 62.5% (55/88) to 96.6% (85/88) over an olddef-only injection baseline; on the KernJC set, FCC reduces the average candidate set size by 78.7% compared to KernJC (Avg. 14.72 vs. 69.00 options per CVE). A stage-wise analysis of time and token costs shows that Stage I dominates overhead, while CVE-focused evidence selection substantially reduces this cost. By returning an effective and auditable 1-minimal configuration boundary, FCC helps vendors scope triggerability against their deployment configurations with a clear, tool-supported decision line.

Loading executive summary...

LINK COPIED TO CLIPBOARD