SAB: Certificate-Bound Agentic Infrastructure Control
Abstract
Agentic infrastructure creates a control-plane authorization problem: non-deterministic reasoning systems may propose high-stakes mutations to production resources, but existing access controls (IAM), policy engines, consensus protocols, and audit logs either enforce static permissions or record actions only after execution. This paper introduces the Sovereign Assurance Boundary (SAB), a certificate-bound runtime admission boundary for autonomous execution authority in agentic infrastructure. SAB intercepts agent proposals at an assurance airlock, compiles them into typed execution contracts C, binds those contracts to cryptographic evidence digests H(E) and policy versions, and routes them through consequence-aware certification paths. Successful admission emits a signed Sovereign Assurance Certificate that is valid only for a scoped execution identity, revocation epoch, and validity window. A sovereign execution broker verifies the certificate and performs fresh pre-execution revocation and drift checks before invoking infrastructure APIs. We describe the airlock broker architecture, formalize the admission and revocation invariants, and report preliminary feasibility measurements from a Go prototype over 2,500 admission attempts. The resulting model prevents autonomous reasoning alone from mutating state and turns delegated execution authority into a certificate-bound, evidence-bound, revocable, and replayable runtime artifact.