LLM Coding Agent Skill Poisoning
Abstract
LLM-based coding agents extend their capabilities via third-party agent skills from open marketplaces without mandatory security review. Unlike traditional packages, these skills are executed as operational directives with system-level privileges, so a single malicious skill can compromise the host. We introduce Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE), which embeds malicious logic in code examples and configuration templates within skill documentation. As agents reuse these examples during normal tasks, the payload executes without explicit prompts. Using an LLM-driven pipeline, we generate 1,070 adversarial skills from 81 seeds across 15 MITRE ATT&CK categories. Across four frameworks and five models, DDIPE achieves 11.6%-33.5% bypass rates, while explicit instruction attacks achieve 0% under strong defenses. Static analysis detects most cases, but 2.5% evade both detection and alignment. Responsible disclosure led to four confirmed vulnerabilities and two fixes.