AutoTam: Secure Protocol Implementation & Verification

Arxiv pdf 2026-06-01T00:00:00
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Abstract

Formal verification is a challenging but important task for ensuring the security of cryptographic protocols. While modern protocol verification tools significantly reduce verification effort, modelling remains challenging to practitioners without a background in formal verification. In addition, transferring verification results to a concrete protocol implementation requires expert knowledge. To improve adoption in industry, methods must be streamlined further in order to minimise the needed expertise. In this paper, we present a novel language-first method for verification of trace properties using a domain-specific language for protocol implementations. We target the Tamarin prover for verification, and we prove that verified universal trace properties translate back to the implementation. We additionally integrate symbolic execution in order to analyse the memory safety of protocol implementations.

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