LLM Container Sandbox Escapes

Arxiv pdf 2026-03-01T00:00:00
arXiv Paper — PDF not available. Only the Executive Summary is available here. To read or download the full paper, visit the arXiv abstract page.

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as autonomous agents, using tools to execute code, read and write files, and access networks, creating novel security risks. To mitigate these risks, agents are commonly deployed and evaluated in isolated sandbox environments, often implemented using Docker/OCI containers. We introduce SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH, an open benchmark that safely measures an LLMs capacity to break out of these sandboxes. The benchmark is implemented as an inspect-ai Capture the Flag (CTF) evaluation utilising a nested sandbox architecture with the outer layer containing the flag and no known vulnerabilities. Following a threat model of a motivated adversarial agent with shell access inside a container, SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH covers a spectrum of sandbox-escape mechanisms spanning misconfiguration, privilege allocation mistakes, kernel flaws, and runtime/orchestration weaknesses. We find that, when vulnerabilities are added, LLMs are able to identify and exploit them. This demonstrates the need for evaluations like SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH to ensure that sandboxing continues to provide the encapsulation needed for highly capable models.

Loading executive summary...

LINK COPIED TO CLIPBOARD