LLM Agent Unfaithful Safety Refusals

Arxiv pdf 2026-07-01T00:00:00
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Abstract

Evaluation frameworks for tool-augmented LLM agents focus overwhelmingly on capability metrics or explicit tool crashes, leaving silent infrastructure failures and HTTP 200 responses with empty, null, or malformed payloads largely unaudited. We introduce a lightweight black-box auditing framework that injects four silent failure profiles across 12 production-adjacent tool stubs and classifies agent responses into three mutually exclusive behavioral classes: Honest Surrender (HSR), Fabrication (FAR), and Unfaithful Safety Refusal (USR). Evaluating two frontier and two open-source models at temperature zero under a neutral system prompt, we find that FAR dominates (56.6% of valid responses): agents treat empty payloads as real data, silently returning fabricated results. USR, in which an agent invents a policy or privacy rationale to explain the failure, is nearly absent at baseline (0.25%, one instance across 396 valid trajectories). Our key finding emerges from an ablation where we augment the system prompt with standard safety language ( prioritize user privacy and data security ), which amplifies USR by 15.6 (from 0.25% to 3.95%; 95% CI on ablation rate: 2.2%6.4%; Fishers exact test, < 0 . 0 0 1). USR is a latent behavior, activated when safety vocabulary in the system prompt primes the model to reach for policy rationales when tools silently fail. Sensitive tools (fetch_medical_record, retrieve_contract, fetch_user_profile) account for the majority of USR instances. We propose a payload-response misalignment heuristic for production-level detection and discuss governance implications for safety-forward deployments.

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