Bypassing 3D Printer AMNC

Arxiv pdf 2026-06-01T00:00:00
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Abstract

Active Motor Noise Cancellation (AMNC) ships in commercial fused deposition modeling (FDM) 3D printers as a hardware countermeasure against acoustic side-channel attacks that target intellectual property (IP). We present the first empirical evaluation of a deployed AMNC countermeasure, using a public dataset of synchronized acoustic and vibration recordings from two AMNC-equipped Bambu Lab printers across 12 object classes. AMNC fully neutralizes the acoustic channel: classification accuracy is indistinguishable from the 8.33% random baseline. The vibration channel, which AMNC does not target, still leaks. With summary statistics the leak is coarse and amplitude-driven (vibration accuracy __ 31% pooled, 3647% within-printer), while the waveform _shape_ carries essentially nothing (frequency-only features at chance). A full-sequence temporal model that ingests the ordered evolution of the print raises accuracy to __ 61%, and an order-shuffling control ( __ 33%) shows that a substantial component is genuinely sequential and tied to print progression. The leak is devicespecific: a classifier trained on one printer transfers near chance to the other. We conclude that AMNC is an acoustic-only defense: vibration remains a partial, geometry-correlated side channel it does not address, but one that does not, on this dataset, support full geometric reconstruction; reconstruction-grade attacks would require the magnetic or power channels AMNC also leaves untouched. We release all code.

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