Abstract

Machine learning is widely used for malware detection, but its decisions must be explained. An analyst needs to know whether a model has learned genuine malicious behavior or only dataset-specific patterns [1]. SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) is the standard tool for this, backed by formal properties such as local accuracy, missingness, and consistency. We argue that these guarantees are insufficient for reliable malware interpretation. We claim SHAP explains a chosen feature-coalition game, not malware behavior in the data. That game is fixed only after the analyst selects the feature players, the missing feature rule, the background distribution, and the simplified input mapping. In static Portable Executable feature spaces, groups such as byte histograms, byte-entropy, strings, headers, sections, imports, and data-directories are not independent signals but are jointly shaped by file structure, packing, compiler behavior, and family conventions. We prove that this dependence makes conditional SHAP dilute a models feature credit by a factor of 1 /m across m 1 redundant features, attributes importance to features the model never uses, and even reverses the sign of an unused features attribution when the data distribution changes; interventional SHAP, meanwhile, queries off-manifold coalitions that no real executable would exhibit. Experiments on EMBER2018, EMBER-2024, and BODMAS with fixed LightGBM and XGBoost detectors confirm these effects. We therefore position SHAP as a limited diagnostic that requires an explicitly stated data distribution and domain validation, not a standalone account of malware behavior.