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Cold Relic: Cross-Cloud Identity Compromise in Google Workspace and Microsoft Entra ID

Published November 19, 2026

Cold Relic (UNC4057/COLDRIVER), a Russia-linked espionage actor, compromised a U.S. organization via initial cloud identity access in Google Workspace and Microsoft Entra ID. The actor stole session cookies, OAuth refresh tokens, and SAML assertions to impersonate identities and pivot across cloud tenants. Abuse of federated identity and malicious OAuth grants enabled lateral movement into third-party environments. Mandiant and Google GTIG linked the intrusion to credential harvesting and cross-tenant synchronization abuse, resulting in multi-tenant espionage and data exfiltration risk.

  • Incident/Breach Overview: U.S. Organization Compromise

    • Initial compromise of cloud identity in Google Workspace or Microsoft Entra ID during 2026.
    • Incident response and attribution led by Mandiant and Google GTIG.
    • Intrusion expanded to linked third-party SaaS tenants via cross-cloud pivot.
    • Impact includes espionage, potential data exfiltration, and erosion of federated trust.
  • Attack Vector/Campaign Mechanics: Identity Impersonation Chain

    • Theft of Google Workspace session cookies and OAuth refresh tokens.
    • Use of SAML tokens and federated identity assertions for cross-cloud authentication.
    • Malicious OAuth app grants and consent phishing within Microsoft Entra ID.
    • Abuse of cross-tenant synchronization and hybrid identity connectors.
  • Threat Group Profile: Cold Relic (UNC4057/COLDRIVER)

    • Russia-linked cyber espionage actor formerly tracked as COLDRIVER and UNC4057.
    • Shifted from traditional credential phishing to cross-cloud identity compromise.
    • Weaponizes initial cloud access as a launchpad for downstream intrusions.
    • Targets U.S. organizations and associated third-party environments.
  • Indicators of Compromise / Defensive Actions

    • Stolen session cookies, OAuth refresh tokens, compromised service accounts, and SAML assertions.
    • Malicious OAuth grants in Entra ID and UNC4057 phishing infrastructure.
    • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA and restrict OAuth consent grants.
    • Audit federated trust, rotate credentials, and monitor cross-tenant synchronization.
  • Conclusion

    • Cross-cloud identity abuse enables lateral movement beyond single SaaS boundaries.
    • Federated trust relationships require continuous monitoring and conditional access enforcement.
    • CISOs must audit SaaS session lifecycles and third-party identity linkages.

Related posts

  1. thehackernews.com — Russian COLD RELIC Hackers Use Stolen Google Workspace Data to Breach Second U.S. Organization
  2. cloudblog.withgoogle.com — COLD RELIC: A Case Study in Impersonation and Compromise
  3. News
  4. Viry
  5. Malpedia
  6. Pmc
  7. Blog
  8. Redhawkdefense
  9. Beinsure
  10. Reddit
  11. Therecord
  12. Brandefense
  13. SecurityWeek — Russian APT Poses as Employee of Hacked Firm to Breach Another US Organization

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